Waste management and the “Value Plan”

Uruguay has spent more than two decades attempting to build an effective packaging waste management system. Law No. 17,849 was the first major attempt, but the results never met the established goals: recycling levels remained very low, the informal circuit continued to dominate, and oversight was scarce. Years later, Law No. 19,829 expanded obligations, requiring all companies to develop their own waste management plans. That, too, was insufficient.

Faced with this diagnosis, the Ministry of Environment promoted a collective mechanism with centralized financing and concrete goals. This mechanism is the Packaging Recovery Plan Trust (Fideicomiso Plan de Valorización de Envases), or simply, Plan Vale.

Who is obligated?

Current regulations apply to every company—national or foreign—that packages or imports packaged products destined for the Uruguayan market. This is not a sector-specific obligation, nor is it limited to large volumes: the criterion is the activity itself.

What does Plan Vale aim to achieve?

The goal is to increase recycling from approximately 6,000 tons per year today to 35,000 tons per year. To achieve this, the Plan works on two fronts:

1. A Deposit-Return System (DRS): Seeking to create concrete incentives for consumers to return single-use packaging.

2. A New Selective Recovery System: Targeting paper, plastic, glass, film, and other materials, with aspirations for expansion.

Reaching these objectives requires investments of approximately USD 50 million. Hence the decision to structure the mechanism as a trust (fideicomiso): to channel corporate contributions and access financing in an organized manner.

The Legal Structure: A Trust with Well-Defined Parties

Plan Vale takes the form of an administration trust involving two main actors. The Chamber of Industries of Uruguay (CIU) acts as the settlor (fideicomitente) and beneficiary: it promotes the plan, transfers assets to the trust, and receives the benefits of its management. AFISA—an investment fund administrator—operates as the trustee (fiduciario), meaning it administers the trust property independently and according to the contract instructions (Decree No. 190/2025 granted the Trust a series of tax exemptions).

A relevant legal aspect is that companies joining Plan Vale will not, strictly speaking, be parties to the trust contract. Their link to the system is channeled through a Letter of Adhesion, placing them in the position of "adherents." This has important practical consequences: companies are bound by the terms of the trust and the conditions established by the Plan itself, without having directly negotiated the framework contract or possessing the same rights as full parties. This is a distinction worth clarifying when evaluating the scope of the commitments assumed.

Obligations Involved in Adhesion

Joining Plan Vale is formalized by signing the Letter of Adhesion:

• Duration: The commitment is for 15 years, starting from the Trust's acceptance of the adhesion. It is not a short-term or annually renewable contract; those who enter do so for the long haul.

• Quarterly Fee: Contributions are calculated based on the kilograms of packaging each company places on the market, as reported in a Sworn Declaration submitted to the Ministry of Environment. To verify the accuracy of this data, Plan Vale will work in conjunction with the DGI (Tax Administration). There is a minimum quarterly billing amount set by the Plan each year.

• Costly Exit: Anyone leaving the Plan before its expiration must pay their proportional share of the outstanding financing balance—plus interest—plus an amount equivalent to their share of the Plan's billings in the final year.

• Fee Adjustment for Dropouts: If the total kilograms declared by all companies falls by more than 5% compared to reference values, the fee is recalculated.

The Critical Point: The Joint and Several Liability Clause

Of all the obligations assumed by adhering companies, the joint and several liability regime (solidaridad) regarding financing deserves the most attention. The mechanism works as follows: each company's fee is calculated based on the total packaging declared by all companies in the system, without excluding those who may stop paying. If a company falls into arrears or leaves the Plan, the others must cover the difference through an additional fee, distributed proportionally based on their declared kilograms.

Plan Vale authorities have reported they are working on establishing a cap on the fee amount, which would provide companies with greater certainty regarding their maximum exposure.

Alternatives and Perspectives

Few companies have a genuine alternative to Plan Vale. Designing an individual plan with national reach—covering the entire territory and satisfying regulatory requirements—would be complex and costly. Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment has signaled clearly that it does not intend to approve alternative plans. The margin for individual negotiation is, in practice, very limited.

Assuming that adhesion is the most viable path, the key will lie in oversight. This includes: effective control mechanisms for sworn declarations (where DGI information will play a fundamental role), the trustee's management of arrears, transparency in the Trust's accountability, and the actual capacity of adhering companies to monitor the system's operation. Adhesion without active monitoring is "blind adhesion," and in a 15-year contract, that has consequences.

Deadline

The Ministry of Environment has set a deadline expiring at the end of April 2026 for Plan Vale to submit the list of adhering companies. Several of the country's leading companies—which also sit on the Plan Vale board—have already formalized their incorporation. Companies that have not yet done so are, in practice, under growing pressure to define their position.